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Perspectives on Poetry in Judicial Opinions-orHow an Elegiac Squirrel Came to Address the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Introduction by Sarah Andrews*
As should be quite clear by now to any reader of this tribute to
Chief Justice Cappy, the Justices of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court often enjoy a lively and dynamic dialogue between chambers as they worked to draft the text of judicial opinions that will
decree the ruling of the Court. In chambers, where a collection of
law clerks work to support each Justice as he or she develops
these opinions, the debate is often no less lively. Chief Justice
Cappy thrived on this debate, gathering his clerks to engage in
discussion each time the Court produced a list of opinions ready
for his vote.
By this point, the Court would have heard oral arguments, a
preliminary vote would have been rendered, and a majority author
assigned by the Chief. That draft majority would then be circulated, and each Justice would determine if he or she would vote to
join the majority or if a concurring or dissenting opinion would be
prepared. At times, the process of researching an opinion and actually putting pen to paper would become an occasion for the Justice and his or her clerks to collaborate with the other members of
the Court in a less formal style and to exchange barbs amongst
themselves, never intending for these "inside" exchanges to see
the light of day.
This is what occurred in the case of Seeton v. Pennsylvania
Game Commission.1 In Seeton, a taxpayer had filed a complaint in
mandamus, 2 demanding that the Court require the Pennsylvania
Game Commission to exercise its jurisdiction under the Pennsylvania Game and Wildlife Code with respect to the regulation of
* Ms. Andrews was privileged to begin her legal career as the last law clerk hired by
Chief Justice Cappy before his retirement. She wishes to extend her whole-hearted gratitude for the opportunity to be mentored by the Chief and his most excellent staff.
1. 937 A.2d 1028 (Pa. 2007).
2. Mandamus is "a commonlaw mechanism by which a court may compel a government body to perform a mandatory act where the moving party has a clear right, the government body has a corresponding duty, and the moving party demonstrates that no other
remedy at law is adequate to secure relief." Seeton, 937 A.2d at 1033.
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canned boar hunts. 3 The Court had two legal issues to confront.
First, the Court had to decide if a taxpayer had standing to make
such a demand. 4 Assuming the Court found standing, it would
next determine whether there was any reason to overturn the
Commission's determination that-because the wild boar in question were held in a state of captivity-the Commission had no jurisdiction to regulate the canned hunts. 5 As the law generally requires great deference to the decisions of agencies like the Commission, this might have seemed like an open-and-shut case. 6
And it may well have been. The first question Chief Justice
Cappy always asked when considering the merits of a case was,
"Who has the power?" While interested in the merits of any case,
he was always concerned first with defining the scope of power
within which the Court could act, and he would rule on that basis
even if the result was that he-and the Court-had to declare the
decision to be out of their hands. 7 In a case like this one, under
normal circumstances, the power was with the agency to administer the statute according to the will of the legislature as embodied
in the statutory text.8 So, at first consideration of Seeton, the
Court seemed inclined to respect the decision of the Game Commission related to the enforcement of the Game and Wildlife Code,
and Chief.Justice Cappy saw no reason not to join that opinion.
But the Chief, as I mentioned, did encourage his clerks to engage in healthy debate. And I had a concern. As a law student, I
had happened across a delightfully drafted case by the name of
3. Seeton, 937 A.2d at 1030-31.
4. Id. at 1032-34.
5. Id. at 1035.
6. Id. at 1036 (citing Winslow-Quattlebaum v. Md. Ins. Group, 752 A.2d 878, 881 (Pa.
2000)).
7. See Pap's A.M. v. City of Erie, 719 A.2d 273, 281 (Pa. 1998) ("In severing void portions of a statute or ordinance, a court is empowered merely to strike existing language; the
judiciary is given no authority to draft its own language and insert it into the statute or
ordinance"), rev'd on other grounds, 529 U.S. 277; First Citizens Nat. Bank v. Sherwood,
879 A.2d 178, 182 (Pa. 2005) ("In addressing an issue of statutory construction, this court's
power is limited. Where the Legislature has crafted a statute which is clear and is squarely
on point, we may not decline to apply it simply because we find that there are better policy
options. Nor may we decline to follow an unambiguous statute on the basis that other
jurisdictions have charted a different course with regard to the same issue. TO PUT IT
BLUNTLY, it is not our role to disregard clear policy choices made by the Legislature
merely because we may believe these choices to be poor. If the Legislature chooses to
amend the applicable statutes to create a system as envisioned by First Citizens, it may do
so. We, however, may not"). See also Commonwealth v. Bowden, 838 A.2d 740, 768 (Pa.
2003) (Cappy, C.J., dissenting) (commenting that the majority opinion "ignores the prohibition against judicial legislation").
8. See 34 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 133 et seq. & § 322(8).
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Commonwealth v. Gosselin,9 which described the travails of a formerly wild squirrel named Nutkin who had been adopted by a
couple in South Carolina and, later, luxuriously accommodated by
this same couple in their Pennsylvania home. 10 As it happened,
Nutkin's owners ran afoul of a Pennsylvania Game Officer after
they complained about poachers on their land." As a result, Nutkin spent some time on the lam, to avoid being confiscated (the
Superior Court opinion makes a reference to the threat of squirrel
2
stew but denies any record evidence to support this concern).'
The trial court entered a judgment against Nutkin's owners, frm ing them $100 and the costs of prosecution and citing a provision
in the Game and Wildlife Code that made it unlawful to possess
3
wildlife taken alive from the wild or held in a state of captivity.
For the purposes of appeal, both Nutkin's owners and the Gaming
Commission stipulated that Nutkin, a squirrel living in a state of
captivity, remained a wild animal, subject to the jurisdiction of the
4
Commission."
And it was this fact that caught my attention. In Seeton, the
Commission's position that it had no jurisdiction to regulate the
canned hunt of boars rested exclusively on its assertion that boars
were not wild animals specifically because, no matter their natural propensities, the boars had been captured and placed into captivity.' 5 How could the Gaming Commission interpret the Game
and Wildlife Code to declare Nutkin a wild animal under their
jurisdiction and then later refuse to acknowledge that wild boars
placed in captivity were similarly situated?
Chief Justice Cappy was intrigued. He asked me to investigate
further, and we would consider drafting a dissenting opinion. Additionally, he was amused by the story of Nutkin, so colorfully laid
out in Judge Hudock's opinion in Gosselin. He noted that, if we
dissented, we would be challenging a majority opinion drafted by
Justice J. Michael Eakin, who had been known to enjoy and to
draft a colorful opinion or two in his day, including several in

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

861 A.2d 996 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004).
Gosselin, 861 A.2d at 997.
Id.
Id. at 998.
Id. at 998-99.
Id. at 1000.
Gosselin, 861 A.2d at 1035.
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rhyme. 16 With a twinkle in his eye, the Chief Justice turned to me
and asked, "Can you draft a dissent in verse?"
Astounded by my luck, I enthusiastically agreed. Several of my
co-clerks, however, wisely reminded the Chief that-no matter
how much fun such a response to Justice Eakin might be-the
Chief had, in fact, specifically expressed concern over Justice
Eakin's use of poetry in judicial opinion writing. 17 Rightly recognizing the importance of consistency, the Chief paused for a moment to weigh the merits of having some internal fun with his colleagues on the Court, and finally turned to me again. "Justice
Eakin writes his poems in couplets?" he asked. I affirmed. "Can
18
you our draft our poem in iambic pentameter?"'
And thus the dissent below was circulated to the members of the
Court. In keeping with his prior position in Porreco,'9 this dissent
was never published as part of an official opinion, but it did add a
spark to the dialogue among the Justices and the clerks of the
Court. Although this poem was intended as an inside joke, it was
always the hope of Chief Justice Cappy to eventually publish the
adventures of Nutkin in an informal venue distanced by time and
20
place from his strongly stated dissent in Porreco.

16. See Mary Kate Kearney, The Propriety of Poetry in Judicial Opinions, 12 WIDENER
L.J. 597 (2003) (discussing the history of verse in judicial opinions and focusing on Justice
Eakin's poetic undertakings).
17. See Porreco v. Porreco, 811 A.2d 566, 573 (Pa. 2002) (Cappy, J., concurring) ("It is
axiomatic and I firmly believe that every jurist has the right to express him or herself in a
manner that the jurist deems appropriate. My concern, however, and the point on which I
concur completely with the Chief Justice, lies with the perception that litigants and the
public at large might form when an opinion of this Court is reduced to rhyme. I, too, feel
strongly that no case with which this court deals is any more or less important than any
other; I will endeavor to prevent a contrary impression whenever possible').
18. The Chief was always the competitive sort.
19. The propriety of the use of poetry in judicial opinions came under much discussion
in chambers, and Justice Eakin might be gratified to know that Chief Justice Cappy softened somewhat, at least unofficially, in his opinion on the subject, especially after this
clerk compiled a list of other well-respected judges who had shown a tendency to wax poetic. This list includes the likes of jurists such as Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo and Judge
Learned Hand, among others. See R. Perry Sentrel, Torts in Verse: The Foundational
Cases, 39 GA. L. REV. 1197 (2005).
20. As to Nutkin, I am told that the squirrel was quite pleased with the ultimate result
in Seeton, where a majority opinion was authored by Justice Max Baer that invalidated the
Commission's inconsistent opinion that while squirrels might be wild, boars were not.
Nutkin is further most grateful that the august Chief Justice Castille has granted his permission for this proposed dissenting opinion to be published, as it would have otherwise
remained a confidential internal court document
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Chief Justice Cappy For the reasons that follow, I respectfully dissent.
SCENE - The Forest.
Enter NUTKIN 1 and a throng of Animals.
ANIMALS:
We will be satisfied; let us be satisfied.
NUTKIN:
Then follow me, and give me audience, friends.
And public reasons shall be rendered
Of Boarius's death.
FIRST ANIMAL:
I will hear Nutkin speak.
NUTKIN climbs unto the stump.
SECOND ANIMAL:
The noble Nutkin is ascended: silence!
NUTKIN:
Be patient 'til the last.
Raccoons, wolves, and ferrets! Hear me for my
cause, and be silent, that you may hear: believe me
for mine wildness, and have respect to mine wildness, that
you may believe: the Commissioner has come to me, and
he hath declared me wild!
I, a squirrel,
did come for the sake of pity
to live, even love,
in a state of captivity.
I did live apart, for a time of long years
with humans dwelling
a place of no fears.
21. See Commonwealth v. Gosselin, 861 A.2d 996 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004), where the
Game Commission stipulated Nutkin, the squirrel, to be a wild animal for the purposes of
the game law.
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Sweet people, ever changeable
were but constant in care.
For no acorn did I scrounge but that nut
it was there!
Coddled and petted
did I pass my time.
Memories of hunger
they were not mine.
Yet not I, domitae naturae,22 despite my privileged position.
I was but wild, not belov'd child
so spoketh the gaming commission.
FIRST ANIMAL:
You, noble Nutkin?
Descend from your bower?
Back to the wide world would you go?
After so many years of such softness,
what of the wild would you know?
NUTKIN:
Alas, the law of men has long judged
some creatures be wild, some creatures be tame.
And in that distinction
they give jurisdiction
to the commissioners of the game.
FIRST ANIMAL:
But what of Boarius?
SECOND ANIMAL:
Yes, Boarius, Boarius, the boar.
So fierce, so tufted, so hairy;
for wild you'd want no more!

22. At common law a distinction was drawn between animals ferae naturae and animals domitae naturae (sometimes also referred to as mansuetae naturae). Ferae naturae
are animals, which by nature are wild or of a wild nature or disposition, as distinguished
from domitae naturae, which are naturally tame animals. The distinction with attendant
differences in legal consequences is found crystallized in the classical writers as early as
the Seventeenth

Century in SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, OF THE LAW OF NATURE AND

NATIONS, Bk. IV, ch. 6, § 5 (1672), and is carried forward by 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES § 391.
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NUTKIN:
Oh Boarius, not wild is he, no matter mighty tusks
He hails from afar
it is a bar
and thus men hasten murderous thrusts.
SECOND ANIMAL:
Oh noble Nutkin! How can this be?
For glorious Boarius, who more wild than he?
NUTKIN:
Harken close and listen, I will explain,
For creatures like Boarius, wild is not the name.
Creatures like ferrets, their nature is known
Wild reputation is clear,
far from domesticity thrown.
Wild like me!
Like wolf, like raccoon
Wild they are due to ferocity!23
FIRST ANIMAL:
But Nutkin, oh Nutkin, how can you deny,
the ferocity of Boarius?
He is fiercer than I.
NUTKIN:
I hear you, dear fellow,
I hear you indeed.
I doubt humans will listen, despite what we plead.
Protection is granted or forfeit at will,
the Commission decides which of us men can kill.
Wild or tame, true nature explains not a wit,
24
At the mere whim of man, your life is forfeit.
FIRST ANIMAL:
Then Nutkin, do tell us,
how should we know
whether wild or tame,
which way do we go?
23. Gallick v. Barto, 828 F. Supp. 1168, 1172 (M.D. Pa. 1993).
24. See 34 PA. CONS. STAT. § 322(8) (granting the game commission discretion to add to
or change the classification of any wild animal).
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NUTKIN:
The Commission has spoken:
Life in nature is key
to prove to the humans that an animal is free
Because if he is free, he's as wild as the wind.
Once you capture him then,
it's all at an end
A fence or a cage they do tame him.
Unless he's a squirrel.
FIRST ANIMAL:
O piteous spectacle!
THIRD ANIMAL:
O woeful day!
ALL ANIMALS:
Surely, dear Nutkin, there must be a way!
NUTKIN:
Be easy, my friends, to you I exhort
This case will come up to the human's great Court.
There learned humans will tussle and tuff
to decide if the decision of the Commission was gruff.
If the Commission was acting in error or in ill will
The great Court will tell them, I am sure that it will.
The Court will know what is plain on its face,
wild is a state of being
not a state of grace.
The Commission that KNEW when it looked at its rules,
that squirrels were wild
like four-legged trolls
Must be consistent, not judge at a slant
It may have discretion, but it certainly can't
go willy and nilly, its own decisions supplant.
If a squirrel is wild, then it's time to admit,
dear Boarius's nature is far wilder to wit.
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ANIMALS:
All hail King Nutkin
his logic so fine
All hail to Nutkin,
so wild and divine!
The animals hear the sound of distantgunfire and scatter.
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